The setting
Dak To was a small outpost with an airstrip in Kontum province, in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. The area is rugged, with steep, forested hills and dense jungle, and it lies close to the borders with Laos and Cambodia. It was strategically useful because it sat near infiltration routes used by North Vietnamese units coming south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. A Special Forces camp had operated in the region for several years.
In the autumn of 1967 American intelligence detected a build-up of North Vietnamese forces in the area. The battle that followed, usually dated from early to late November 1967, was one of a series of hard border fights that autumn. Others took place at places such as Con Thien near the demilitarised zone and Loc Ninh near the Cambodian border. Together they have often been called the border battles.
The forces
On the American side, the 4th Infantry Division and the 173rd Airborne Brigade were the main formations, with other units, including elements of the 1st Cavalry Division, plus South Vietnamese troops brought in as the fighting grew. They faced the North Vietnamese 1st Division, which was reported to include several regiments. These were regular army soldiers rather than local guerrillas, well equipped and dug in on the high ground, and they had prepared bunkers and fighting positions in advance.
The opening phase involved patrols and sweeps in the hills around Dak To in late October and early November. As contact increased, American commanders reinforced the area. The fighting moved from patrol clashes to fierce assaults on fortified hilltops. Climbing steep slopes under fire against dug-in defenders was costly, and the dense cover limited both visibility and the use of supporting weapons.
The fight for the hills
Several hills became objectives in the middle of the month, among them hills known by their height in metres. Artillery and air strikes were called in heavily, and helicopters brought in supplies and evacuated the wounded. Mortar and rocket fire struck the airstrip itself, and an attack on 12 November is often reported to have caused the destruction of an ammunition dump. Transport aircraft were used to bring in ammunition and reinforcements.
The most famous episode was the battle for Hill 875, in the middle and later part of the month. Paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade, supported by other units, tried to take the hill, which was strongly held by North Vietnamese troops in bunkers connected by trenches. On 19 November, a bomb dropped by an American aircraft in error landed within the American lines, killing dozens of paratroopers and wounding many more. The incident, one of several friendly-fire accidents of the war, added to the already high casualties.
The attackers withdrew to regroup and wait for reinforcements, then renewed the assault. After more bombardment and more fighting, American troops reached the top of the hill on 23 November, which was Thanksgiving Day in the United States. By then the North Vietnamese had largely pulled out, leaving a ridge scarred by shelling and strewn with the dead.
The toll and the claims
Casualty figures vary by source. American deaths in the fighting at Dak To are commonly reported at close to 300, with many more wounded. American commanders claimed that well over a thousand North Vietnamese soldiers had been killed, and described the battle as a clear allied victory. Those enemy figures rest on body counts and estimates and should be treated cautiously.
Both sides drew different conclusions. The American command held that North Vietnamese units had come out of their sanctuaries to fight and had been badly beaten, which fitted the strategy of attrition. General William Westmoreland, who visited in the course of the battle, used it as evidence that the enemy could be defeated. Within days he was in Washington reporting on progress, and Dak To was used as supporting evidence.
Critics saw things differently. They noted that the cost to the Americans was heavy for hills that were abandoned shortly afterwards, that the enemy had chosen the time and place of the battle, and that the forces concerned simply returned to their base areas across the border. The question whether the result justified the losses was widely asked.
What Hanoi may have intended
Historians have long discussed the purpose of the border battles. One view is that they were designed to draw American and South Vietnamese forces away from the populated lowlands and cities in preparation for the Tet Offensive of early 1968. The Highlands fights, Loc Ninh, Con Thien and later the siege of Khe Sanh would, on this reading, form a series of diversions or tests that tied down American attention and manpower. Another view stresses that these were real attempts to inflict losses and win victories in their own right. The evidence available to outside historians supports both readings, and the two are not mutually exclusive.
Why it matters
Dak To showed how costly it was for American units to attack fortified positions in difficult terrain, even with overwhelming firepower. It demonstrated that the North Vietnamese regular army was capable of fighting hard battles. And it came at an awkward time politically, as the administration was telling the public that the enemy was being worn down, a theme explored in the account of General Westmoreland’s progress reports.
For the soldiers, the memory was less abstract. Accounts of soldiers in Vietnam often return to hill fights such as these: climbing slopes in tropical heat, taking casualties from hidden positions, and then being told that the ground had been taken, only to leave it soon afterwards. The wider context of that autumn is covered in the survey of the Vietnam War in 1967.