A note on dates
Khe Sanh belongs to 1968 rather than 1967, but its story starts in the previous year, and it shaped the way the year turned. The siege began on 21 January 1968 and is usually considered to have ended in early April, when American forces reopened the road to the base; fighting in the area continued for some time afterwards. This article covers the siege itself, with the 1967 background it needs.
The base and its position
Khe Sanh lay in the northwest corner of South Vietnam, in Quang Tri province, close to the border with Laos and not far south of the demilitarised zone. It had been a Special Forces outpost and then became a Marine combat base, with an airstrip on a plateau ringed by hills. Its supporters in the military valued it as a western anchor for defences along the DMZ, a base for watching infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and a possible launching point for operations into Laos. Critics thought it was remote, hard to supply except by air, and of little real value.
In the spring of 1967, Marines fought a series of sharp engagements in the nearby hills against North Vietnamese units, in what became known as the hill fights. The fighting around Hills 881 and 861 in April and May of that year showed that Hanoi had substantial forces in the area. By late 1967 intelligence suggested that those forces were growing again.
The siege begins
In the final weeks of 1967 and January 1968, American intelligence reported that two or three North Vietnamese divisions, an estimated 20,000 men or more, were gathering around the base. The Marine garrison was reinforced and eventually numbered somewhere around 6,000, with South Vietnamese Rangers and others also present. On 21 January 1968, North Vietnamese artillery, rockets and mortars began shelling the base, and one of the first hits blew up the main ammunition dump. A nearby outpost was attacked the same day.
The following weeks became a test of endurance. The garrison lived in trenches and bunkers, under shellfire that came in at all hours. The airstrip was frequently under fire, which made resupply by transport aircraft dangerous, and the road to the coast was closed. Aircraft used a variety of methods, including low-level parachute drops, to bring in food, ammunition and other supplies. Marines on outlying hills fought off probes and attacks.
The air campaign
American commanders responded with an enormous bombing effort called Operation Niagara. Fighter-bombers, B-52 bombers and artillery were directed at the surrounding hills and valleys, using sensors and intelligence to find targets. The total tonnage dropped was very large, and Niagara is often cited as one of the heaviest concentrations of air power on a single battlefield in history. Estimates of how many enemy soldiers were killed are uncertain, and they should be treated with care.
On 7 February 1968, North Vietnamese forces, supported by tanks, overran the nearby Special Forces camp at Lang Vei. This was the first use of armour by North Vietnam in the south, and it alarmed the American command. The camp’s defenders and many refugees fell, and the incident raised the fear that the base itself would be next.
Washington’s anxiety
Khe Sanh gained a hold on the American imagination far beyond its military size. Many commentators compared it to Dien Bien Phu, the French base that fell in 1954 and ended France’s war in Indochina. Television and newspapers gave it constant attention. President Johnson was reportedly so concerned that he had a model of the Khe Sanh area built in the White House basement and pressed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give assurances that it could be held. General William Westmoreland insisted that it would not be another Dien Bien Phu, citing American air power and supply capacity.
The comparison was imperfect. The French had lacked the heavy bombing capacity, the helicopters and the aircraft that the Americans brought, and their base was in a valley farther from friendly territory. Even so, it conditioned how the public judged events.
The relief
The pressure on the base eased gradually during March. Operation Pegasus, a large relief operation by the 1st Cavalry Division, together with Marine and South Vietnamese forces, began on 1 April 1968. Using helicopters and ground units, it moved up Route 9, and a link-up with the base took place in the first week of April. Over a few weeks, the road was reopened. North Vietnamese forces, by then, had largely pulled back from the immediate area.
Casualties on the American side during the siege and its aftermath ran to hundreds killed. North Vietnamese losses were far higher according to US estimates, though the numbers are uncertain. Civilians in the area suffered as well.
The debate over purpose
Why did Hanoi surround Khe Sanh? One view, held by Westmoreland and others, was that it intended a major, decisive battle there, and that the siege was the centre of the enemy’s plan. Another view, argued by critics and many historians, was that it was partly a feint, intended to draw American attention and reserves to the northwest while the Tet Offensive struck cities throughout the country. The Tet attacks began on 30 and 31 January, within days of the siege’s opening, which gave the diversion theory a strong circumstantial basis. A reasonable conclusion is that it served more than one purpose, and that North Vietnamese leaders were willing to exploit whatever advantage came from it.
The value of the base was also debated. After the relief, American commanders decided that the position was not worth holding. They began to dismantle and abandon Khe Sanh in June and July 1968. To critics, this seemed an odd end to a siege that had been described as vital. Defenders answered that the battle had inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and that a fixed base was less useful than a mobile defence. The contrast between what was said before and after left a sour impression. It also fed the wider sense, already present in the account of the Tet Offensive, that the official picture of the war was unreliable.