Why the Middle East mattered to Moscow
For the Soviet Union, the Middle East in the 1960s was a field of Cold War competition, not an isolated regional dispute. Soviet leaders wanted influence close to their southern border, access to ports and facilities in the eastern Mediterranean, and friendly governments among newly independent states. Arab nationalist governments, which were often hostile to Western influence, were natural partners.
The relationship with Egypt had been growing since the mid-1950s, when an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, backed by Moscow, supplied Egyptian forces. The Soviets later helped fund the Aswan High Dam and provided military equipment and advisers. Syria, whose government had moved to the left, became another recipient of Soviet arms and political support. The Soviet Union saw these ties as a way of balancing American backing for Israel and for conservative Arab monarchies.
The run-up to war
In the weeks before the war, Soviet behaviour is still debated. In mid-May 1967 Soviet officials reportedly passed Egyptian and Syrian contacts information that Israel was massing forces on the Syrian border. Israel denied this and offered to let Soviet officials visit the area, an offer that was not taken up. Historians disagree about whether Moscow was misled by its own intelligence, was seeking to rally its allies, or did not foresee that Nasser would move so far.
What is clearer is that Moscow did not want a full war. Soviet leaders, who had their own concerns in Vietnam and in Europe, seem to have hoped for a show of strength that would restrain Israel without leading to fighting. When Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran, Soviet statements backed the Arab side but also advised caution. Egypt’s leaders, for their part, did not always consult Moscow before acting.
The hotline exchanges
The Moscow-Washington teletype link, set up after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, was used in earnest during the war. On the morning of 5 June, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin sent a message to President Lyndon Johnson, and the two leaders exchanged messages over the following days. In the early messages both sides stressed their wish for a ceasefire and that neither wanted to be dragged into direct confrontation.
The most tense point came on 10 June, as Israeli forces advanced on the Golan Heights towards Damascus. Kosygin reportedly warned of the possibility of “necessary actions”, which may have included military steps, if Israel did not stop. Washington responded by moving the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean closer to the Syrian coast. A ceasefire was agreed soon afterwards. Historians still differ over how seriously either side contemplated direct intervention, and over how much the warning shaped Israel’s decision to halt.
A parallel event on 8 June, the attack on the USS Liberty, was also communicated to Moscow, with Washington reportedly telling the Soviets about its naval movements to prevent a misunderstanding.
Breaking relations with Israel
On 10 June, with Arab armies defeated, the Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Israel. Most of the other Eastern bloc governments did the same, with Romania the notable exception. Moscow also condemned Israel at the United Nations and called for the withdrawal of its forces from the occupied territories.
Relations were not restored until 1991, at the end of the Soviet period, and for the intervening years the Soviet Union took a harsher line on Israel at the UN. The break also affected Soviet Jews, whose requests to emigrate became a long-running issue between Moscow and Western governments.
Diplomacy at the United Nations and Glassboro
The Soviets pushed for an emergency session of the UN General Assembly, which met in June and July. Kosygin travelled to New York for it, and he met President Johnson at Glassboro in New Jersey on 23 and 25 June. The talks did not produce agreement on the Middle East, but they showed both superpowers trying to keep contact open. Other topics, including arms control, were discussed, and the encounter helped to maintain the dialogue that led to later agreements.
Rebuilding Arab forces
After the war, Moscow resupplied Egypt and Syria with aircraft, tanks and air defence equipment, and increased the number of Soviet advisers in the region. Soviet leaders also supported the Arab position in the diplomacy that led to Resolution 242 in November, though they accepted the compromise language. The defeat embarrassed the Soviets, whose weapons and training had been shown in a poor light, and some Arab leaders questioned their value.
In the longer view, the war pushed Egypt deeper into dependence on Soviet support, which stayed in place until the early 1970s. It also began a period in which the Middle East was one of the main arenas of superpower contact, alongside the Vietnam War, and shaped Moscow’s wider Soviet Middle East policy for years.