A ship off the Sinai coast
USS Liberty was a United States Navy vessel converted into a technical research ship, a description that in practice meant it gathered electronic and communications intelligence. In June 1967 it was sent to the eastern Mediterranean off the northern coast of the Sinai Peninsula, near the town of El Arish, to monitor communications during the Arab-Israeli war. The Navy’s concern was partly to follow the fighting and partly to be ready to assist if American citizens needed evacuating.
By 8 June the Six-Day War had been going for several days, and the Israeli army had reached the Suez Canal in places. The area was a combat zone, and the Liberty sailed slowly in international waters, reportedly flying a large American flag.
The attack
On the afternoon of 8 June, Israeli aircraft attacked the ship with rockets, cannon fire and napalm. Israeli motor torpedo boats then approached and fired torpedoes, one of which struck the hull on the starboard side. The attack lasted for some time, and the ship’s communications were damaged, though the crew managed to send distress calls. The Sixth Fleet launched aircraft from carriers, but they were reportedly recalled, and the vessel was later met by other American ships.
Thirty-four crew members were killed and about 170 were wounded, according to the figures usually given. The captain, William McGonagle, was wounded but kept command, and later received the Medal of Honor. The Liberty did not sink, and it was eventually taken to Malta for temporary repairs.
Israel’s explanation
Israel’s government quickly apologised, saying that its forces had mistaken the ship for an Egyptian vessel, and it was reported to have been identified as the Egyptian ship El Quseir. At that point Israeli troops were fighting in Sinai and had been told of an Egyptian shelling of the coast. Israeli investigations, including a judicial inquiry and a military one, concluded that the attack was an error resulting from poor identification and mistakes in communication, and the officers involved were not prosecuted.
Israel later paid compensation. A sum was paid to the families of those who died in 1968, payments for injured crew followed in the following years, and a payment for the ship’s damage was reached in 1980. The amounts are reported in different ways in different sources, so they are best treated as approximate.
The American investigations
The US Navy held a court of inquiry soon after the event. It found no evidence that the attackers had known the ship was American, and it described the incident as an error, though it had little time and was criticised for the narrow scope of its work. Other official reviews followed in the years afterwards, including by Congress and intelligence bodies, with similar conclusions about mistaken identity but varying levels of detail.
The Johnson administration publicly accepted the Israeli explanation, though it protested strongly. The case came at a time when American attention was also taken up by the Vietnam War escalation, and the White House did not want the incident to damage relations in the middle of a crisis with the Soviet Union.
The competing accounts
The incident remains controversial because the accounts differ on a basic point: was the attack a mistake, or was it deliberate?
- The mistaken-identity account relies on the confusion of the battlefield, the speed at which targets were observed, the difficulty of identifying ships, and the Israeli records which show that aircraft and boats were directed by different commanders. Supporters of it note that Israel had no clear reason to attack its main ally’s ship.
- The deliberate-attack account is held by many of the survivors and by some retired officials. They point to the length of the attack, the ship’s flag and markings, the reconnaissance flights over it earlier in the day, and the reported jamming of its radio frequencies. Some argue that Israel wanted to stop the interception of its communications, for instance about operations on the Golan Heights, though that motive remains speculative and is rejected by Israel.
Some prominent American figures of the period, including then Secretary of State Dean Rusk, expressed doubts about the mistake explanation, while others, including some intelligence officials, accepted it. Historians have continued to review declassified documents without reaching full agreement. A careful reader should note that evidence such as intercepts and logs has been released in part, and that interpretations of it differ.
Why it still matters
For the survivors and their families, the main issue has been recognition and a full public account. For historians of US-Israeli relations, the case shows how an event of a few hours could test the alliance in the middle of a larger war. The ship itself was retired in 1968 and later sold for scrap.