A narrow passage with a long history
The Straits of Tiran lie at the southern end of the Gulf of Aqaba, between the Sinai Peninsula and the Arabian coast. Ships heading to the Israeli port of Eilat, and to Jordan’s Aqaba, must pass through them. For Israel, which had little other access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, the route mattered for oil imports and for trade with Africa and Asia.
During the 1956 Suez crisis, Israel took the Sharm el-Sheikh area on the Sinai side. In early 1957, under pressure, it withdrew. In return, a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was placed on the Egyptian side of the border and at Sharm el-Sheikh, and Israel stated publicly that it would regard a renewed blockade of the straits as a reason to use force. Egypt disputed the legal status of the waterway, which it considered to lie in its territorial waters, while Israel and other maritime states argued it was an international strait. That disagreement was never settled.
The sequence in May 1967
The chain of events moved quickly.
- Mid-May: Syrian-Israeli tension was already high, and Egypt began moving troops into Sinai from 14 May, with parades and statements aimed at showing solidarity with Syria.
- 16 to 19 May: Egypt asked UNEF to withdraw from positions along the border. UN Secretary-General U Thant concluded that the force could not stay without Egypt’s consent, and it was withdrawn. Critics later argued that he could have sought delay or consultation, while supporters said he had no real choice.
- Around 21 to 22 May: Egyptian forces took over Sharm el-Sheikh, and on 22 May Nasser announced that the Straits would be closed to Israeli-flagged vessels and to ships carrying strategic cargo to Israel. The ban began to apply the following day.
- 23 to 24 May: U Thant travelled to Cairo for talks, while Israel and its supporters treated the blockade as a serious provocation.
- 30 May: King Hussein of Jordan flew to Cairo and signed a defence pact with Egypt.
Why the closure carried so much weight
The closure was not a surprise in principle, since Israeli leaders had said in 1957 that they would treat it as grounds for war. In practice, few Israeli-flagged ships had been using the route in the weeks before, and some analysts argue that the economic impact was limited. Others emphasise the symbolic and strategic effect: the closure suggested that the postwar settlement of 1957 was collapsing and that Israel’s deterrence was weakened. Israelis also saw it alongside Egyptian troop movements and bellicose broadcasts, and to many these recalled earlier threats to their country’s survival.
Nasser’s own aims remain disputed. Some historians think he wanted a diplomatic victory, to restore his standing among Arab states and show that he could challenge Israel without a war. Others argue that he and his commanders were willing to risk war, or that events escaped his control. Egyptian officials also made public statements that suggested the army was ready to fight. The Soviet Union had warned him of Israeli plans, and its role is covered under Soviet Middle East policy.
Diplomacy and delay
Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban toured Paris, London and Washington in the last days of May. President Johnson and his aides explored an international naval presence to reopen the straits, an idea sometimes called a maritime force or regatta, but support from other states was thin and the American Congress and public were absorbed by the Vietnam War escalation. French President Charles de Gaulle warned Israel not to be the one to fire first and moved towards an arms embargo, which angered Israeli leaders.
During these weeks the Israeli cabinet agreed to wait for diplomacy. The delay caused anxiety at home, and military leaders were reportedly frustrated by it. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol had a poorly received radio address on 28 May, and in early June he formed a national unity government, bringing in Moshe Dayan as defence minister. The decision to strike was taken in the first days of June.
What came next
Fighting began on the morning of 5 June, when Israel attacked Egyptian airfields. In the longer course of the Six-Day War, Israeli forces captured Sharm el-Sheikh and the Sinai coast, reopening the route. Later diplomacy, including Resolution 242, explicitly referred to freedom of navigation through international waterways in the region.
Freedom of passage at Tiran remained a central issue in Egyptian-Israeli talks, and it was part of the arrangements in the 1979 peace treaty. The May crisis continues to be studied as an example of how a series of steps, each defensible by those who took them, can leave little room to step back.